Schooling. This study estimates the respective contributions of schooling and income in determining the fertility transition within the US states between 1840 and 1980. While evidence suggests that both relationships are negative and statistically signi…cant, the most robust determinant of the transition is the development of human capital as measured by years of schooling. This empirical fact corroborates the use of the quantity-quality trade-o¤ mechanism in theoretical models to generate the transition from economic stagnation to growth.
Introduction
Few countries underwent a transition from low to high economic growth without a concurrent transition from high to low fertility. A deeper understanding of the causes of the fertility transition may therefore improve the understanding of the process countries goes through when moving from a stagnant to a growing economy.
In the economic theories of the fertility transition, rising levels of income and schooling play central roles. In the contributions of Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) it was shown that higher income may induce parents to have fewer children. These theories emphasize that the quantity and quality of children is a joint decision implying that higher income may cause a fertility decline when the income elasticity of quality is su¢ ciently high. More recently, the quantity-quality framework has been applied in Uni…ed Growth Theory (Galor, 2011) . This theory stresses the role of the emergence of mass education in the fertility transition, i.e. a rising demand for human capital makes parents choose to have fewer children in order to give each child more schooling. 1 This paper adds new evidence on the determinants of the fertility transition. The analysis exploits data on cohort fertility, cohort years of schooling, and GDP per worker for a panel of 48 US states observed from 1840 to 1980. This allows us to evaluate the relative importance of variation in income and schooling for the fertility decline in the US over the studied period.
We …nd a robust negative relationship between schooling and fertility, while income per worker has no robust relation to fertility.
Our paper relates to three strands of literature. By focusing on the United States, we contribute to the literature on the US fertility transition. The study by Jones and Tertilt (2008) demonstrates a bivariate relationship between income and cohort fertility using US census data from 1828-1960. They conclude that the di¤erences in fertility "can be accounted for by di¤erences in income alone"(Jones and Tertilt 2007, p.52), but do not pursue to evaluate the relative contributions of schooling and income in determining the fertility transition within the US. 2 Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) seek to explain the US fertility decline with model simulations. They …nd that the shift towards production of manufactured goods which requires skilled labor, and thus education, together with rising income real wages, which increased the 1 In the theory section below, we give an overview of the existing literature on the fertility transition 2 They also demonstrate a bivariate negative relationship between human capital and fertility.
2 time cost of children, were the main drivers of the decline in US fertility. 3 Our paper is also related to the empirical literature studying the causes of the demographic transition across countries. Recent papers in this literature include Angeles (2010) , Herzer et al. (2012) and Murtin (2013) . Both Angeles (2010) and Murtin (2013) estimate dynamic panel models. Angeles uses data for 118 country from 1955-2005 and …nds that GDP per capita is weakly related to total fertility rates, whereas average years of schooling is negatively and signi…cantly related to total fertility. Murtin (2013) studies the evolution of crude birth rates for the period 1870-2000 and …nds primary schooling to be the main determinant for the fertility decline. Herzer et al. (2012) note two weaknesses in the approach taken by Angeles (2010) and Murtin (2013) . First, they question the plausibility of assuming common lag structure in a setting with 100 countries. 4 Second, they point to Roodman (2009) , who shows some econometric challenges with GMM panel estimators known as the "too-many-instruments" problem. Herzer et al. (2012) propose to use panel cointegration as an alternative and …nd that GDP per capita has a negative and signi…cant relation to crude birth rates using crosscountry data from 1900-1999. 5 In general, our …ndings are in line with those of Angeles (2010) and Murtin (2013) as we …nd that schooling is the most important determinant of fertility.
The current analysis is also related to other within-country studies. Becker et al. (2010) use data from Prussia in the 19th century and …nd an important role for education in generating the fertility decline. In particular, counties in Prussia with higher school enrollment rates in 1849 showed a more rapid decrease in fertility. 6 Unfortunately, their study does not include controls for income, so the relative importance of the two variables cannot be evaluated. Murphy (2010) studies fertility di¤erences across French regions for the period 1876-1896 and …ndsin addition to cultural factors-a proxy of income to be positively correlated and a proxy of primary schooling is negatively correlated with family size.
We think that our study has a number of advantages compared to previous research. First, 3 Considering the US in 1850-1860, Steckel (1992) …nds that stronger presence of …nancial institutions and the occupational structure as important for fertility change. 4 They base this on the "well-known that the lag structure between mortality decline and fertility decline di¤ers widely across countries." 5 Due to data limitations, Herzer et al. (2012) only include education variables for a smaller subset of countries studied in the 20th century. There they …nd primary education to be signi…cantly negatively related to fertility. 6 Becker et al. (2010) also study fertility in a cross-section of Prussian counties in 1849 (before the onset of demographic transition) and …nd that children's education causes a decrease in fertility. Becker et al (2013) …nd a negative e¤ect of women's education on fertility in county data from Prussia in 1816, 1849 and 1867.
3 our data contain decadal observations for the period of 1840-1980, which is a longer coverage than the above-mentioned within-country studies, and covers the entire period of 1870-1920
where most of the fertility transition took place in the majority of present day developed countries (Reher, 2004) . 7 Second, compared to cross-country analyses, the current analysis is less troubled by country heterogeneity, such as institutional and cultural di¤erences and di¤erences in the quality of data. Third, we can better address the concern regarding the assumption of a common lag structure. Finally, as also argued by Jones and Tertilt (2007) , the use of cohort fertility as dependent variable is desirable as it provides a more accurate picture of how economic variables a¤ect fertility behavior at a given date compared to period measures such as the total fertility rate.
By employing static and dynamic panel models using both …xed e¤ect and GMM estimation strategies, we …nd a robust negative relationship between schooling and fertility for cohorts between 1840-1980. Our estimates suggests that one additional year of schooling of a child means that the child had 0.15-0.30 fewer siblings. The coe¢ cient on income per worker is not robust: …xed e¤ect estimates suggest a negative e¤ect whereas a dynamic panel framework estimates a positive e¤ect. Our …ndings are in line with qualitative accounts that emphasize that the transition to sustained growth in the US was characterized by an increase in the importance of human capital, e.g. Galor (2011, p.56) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main hypotheses to be investigated. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy.
Section 5 contains our main …ndings and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Theory
This section o¤ers a concise survey of the theories that motivate our empirical strategy. Since the focus of this analysis is to test how changes in income and education relate to the US fertility transition, we focus on theories that highlight their importance. Moreover, we also brie ‡y survey theories that motivate the use of mortality as an explanatory variable in the empirical model. 8 7 Since we have data for the 48 contiguous states from 1840 we use more variation from the 19th century that most of the existing studies. 8 For a more elaborate review of the literature on the fertility transition, see Galor (2011) 4 
Income and fertility
Motivated by the negative cross sectional correlation between income and fertility in developed countries (see Jones and Tertilt, 2007) a signi…cant body of theoretical work, pioneered by the contributions by Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) , suggests that rising income is causing declining fertility. The important insight from these papers is that the (shadow) price of children depends on the level of quality of each child, which is an endogenous variable. Thus, even if children is a "true" normal good, one will observe that richer parents have fewer children if the income elasticity of child quality is su¢ ciently high. 9 Together with the quantity-quality trade-o¤, the time cost of children is the most commonly employed mechanism in the theoretical literature that seeks to explain a negative e¤ect of income on fertility. Increases in parents' wages imply that families can a¤ord more children, but each child is more costly to raise since the value of time has increased, and therefore, if the substitution e¤ect is larger than the income e¤ect, income and fertility are negatively related.
The curvature of the utility function is thus crucial for the predictions of this theory. However, the e¤ect may operate solely through the family budget. If family income comprises more sources than the income from the parent(s) who spend time on child rearing, the price of child rearing will increase more than total family income. One example of this argument is made by Galor and Weil (1996) . However, rather than the level of income, they stress the importance a narrowing gender wage gap during the process of industrialization for the concurrent decline in the fertility. 10 
Schooling and fertility
There are a number of reasons why schooling and fertility are negatively correlated from a theoretical perspective. Galor and Weil (2000) focus on education as the quality of children in a quality-quantity framework. They argue that rising demand for human capital during industrialization triggered parents to have fewer and better educated children and thus a fertility transition. In their theory, the fertility transition and economic transition are interdepen- 9 Becker and Tomes (1976) provide an example of why this may be the case based on a speci…c functional form of the production function for quality. For a detailed presentation of the theories see Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2011) 10 Due to data limitations, we cannot test the importance of the gender wage gap. For evidence in line with this hypothesis, see Schultz (1985) . 5 dent: lower fertility is due to more education which spurs technological progress which further increases education and lowers fertility. This e¤ect of education on fertility via the quantityquality trade-o¤ is also present in later contributions within Uni…ed Growth Theory, such as Galor and Moav (2002) , Doepke (2004) and Cervellati and Sunde (2013). 11 Additionally, since Cochrane (1979) , it has been widely recognized that there is a negative correlation between parents'level of education and fertility is well established. Various mechanisms that link these variables have been suggested in the literature. Possibly, parental education may a¤ect fertility via its e¤ect on income through the above mentioned channels. However, some theories suggest additional channels through which higher education leads to lower fertility. One example is Moav (2005) who argues that better educated parents have a comparative advantage in the production of child quality, implying that better educated parents have fewer children and provide more schooling to each child more. In addition, the time devoted to children may leave less time to human capital accumulation (either formal schooling or on the job training) which directly creates a negative relation between the variables, a mechanism which is present in e.g.
Cervellati and Sunde (2013). 12 
Mortality and fertility
Demographers have focused on the decline in mortality as an explanation of the fertility transition. This line of research is build upon the observation that, for most countries, a drop in mortality is observed before the onset of the fertility transition. As a consequence, the demographic transition theory explains the rapid growth of population in the …rst stage of the demographic transition as a delayed response in fertility to the drop in mortality. 13 11 This e¤ect is also present in de la Croix and Doepke (2003) , studying the e¤ect of inequality on growth from di¤erential fertility. Caldwell (1980) describes potential channels through which children's education might a¤ect fertility. 12 While the mentioned theories argue that the causal link goes from education to fertility, work by e.g. Angrist 13 The United States, together with France, are known to be exceptions, where fertility started to decline before mortality (Haines, 1994 ). This does not rule out the possibility that a drop in mortality causes lower fertility, but it suggest that this is not the only e¤ect.
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If parents target a certain number of surviving children there is a mechanic e¤ect of infant (child) mortality on fertility: a drop in mortality of children would mean that fewer births are needed to reach the desired target. In addition to this, Kalemli-Ozcan (2003; argues that the decline in the uncertainty of the survival rates of children, entailed by lower child mortality, leads parents to decrease their precautionary demand for children. Doepke (2005) studies this in a dynamic setting and …nds that the precautionary motive cannot account for the decline in the number of surviving children during the fertility transition due to a replacement e¤ect. 14 Furthermore, fertility and child mortality may be positively correlated due to a trade o¤ parents face between health investment per child and how many children to have (see e.g. Strulik, 2004 Strulik, , 2008 and Birchenall, 2007) In addition to being an independent causal factor of the fertility decline, mortality may be a channel through which education and income a¤ects fertility. For example, education of parents may lower infant and child mortality and thereby fertility, since fewer births are needed to acquire the desired number of surviving o¤spring (Lam and Duryea, 1999; Schultz, 1994 ).
Data
This section describes the dataset used in the analysis. The variables are measured with 10 years interval which corresponds to 1 period in our empirical model. We use information on the number of children ever born to married white women between the ages 35 and 44, sampled at date in the US Census. 15 Assuming that the fertility decisions for this cohort of women, on average, was determined 20 years prior to , we construct our fertility variable Children s;t ,
which we assume was in ‡uenced by the economic conditions in state s around year t = 20
years. For example, Children s;1900 is then equal to the number children ever born to married white women between the ages 35 and 44 sampled in 1920.
To test whether fertility in a given period varies with the level of schooling obtained during life of the cohort of born in that period, we use a cohort based measure of human capital:
average years of schooling for the cohort born in year t + 4 years, School s;t . For example, School s;1900 gives information on years of schooling for the birth cohort of 1904, who started 14 That is, parents have the opportunity to have more children after the mortality rate of the children already born is known. 15 We obtain these data from Tamura (2012). 7 in the schooling system in 1910, across the US states. We use this measure in our baseline estimations to capture a quantity-quality trade-o¤ as discussed in section 2.2. We also present estimates using a cross-sectional measure-i.e., average years of schooling in the workforce in year t. We use the second measure for two reasons. First, average years of schooling in the workforce arguably proxies for parental education, and theory predicts that the human capital level of the parents is negative linked to the number of o¤springs. This implies that the e¤ect of 
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe our econometric speci…cations. Our approach is to estimate a panel data model with state …xed e¤ects and time e¤ects while also allowing for dynamics in fertility. We follow two strategies to investigate the e¤ect of schooling and income on fertility.
The …rst strategy controls for state and time …xed e¤ects, which take into account that the US states di¤er in many permanent characteristics that we do not observe and which may also a¤ect education and income. This model speci…cation is presented in Section 4.1. The second strategy allows for mean-reverting dynamics and persistent e¤ects in fertility that may be endogenous to income and education. 16 In particular, we estimate the coe¢ cients in equation (1) by system GMM using year lags in the explanatory variables as the "within" instruments. This model speci…cation is presented in Section 4.2.
Fixed E¤ects model
The empirical speci…cation for the …xed e¤ects model is given by:
where Children s;t is the average number of children per woman born around year t in state 
System GMM
In order to disentangle the income-fertility schooling-fertility relationships, we now consider the following dynamic speci…cation:
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where the variables are de…ned as above, though we let t = 1; 2; ::; T , where each period is a decadal observation. We estimate equation (2) with the maximum lag set to the 7th lag. These choice amount to using 30-70 year lags.
However, these choices may lead to "too many instruments" as noted by Roodman (2009) and weak power of J-tests of over-identifying conditions. A solution is to extract principal components of the original instrument set in order to reduce the number of actual instruments as to avoid the problem of "too many instruments". 17 We adopt this solution using 30-70 years lags for instruments. We note that our results do not depend on using principal components but it only serves to reduce the problems with J-tests. Finally, it is important to consider the conditions under which we can attribute a causal interpretation to our estimated coe¢ cients.
This requires that the model has been correctly speci…ed and that lagged values of the variables are valid instruments. Since our instruments date 30 years or more back in the past, the exclusion restrictions seem plausible which warrants a causal interpretation. However, since we do not have credible exogenous sources of variations in schooling and income, one could argue that we are simply using the GMM estimator to remove the mechanical bias resulting from the presence of …xed e¤ects and lagged dependent variable. This would mean that what we …nd are 'robust correlations'(Acemoglu et al., 2013).
Results
This section presents the results. We …rst discuss the results based on Pooled and Fixed E¤ects OLS estimation in section 5.1. Then System GMM results follow in section 5.2. 17 Roodman (2009) himself has implemented these in his STATA module for estimating dynamic panel models using GMM. 10 Table 1 provides the results of estimating equation (1) Table 2 also shows that the e¤ect associated with a 10 percent increase in GDP per worker is -0.05, which is statistically signi…cant at 1 percent level. In the last column of table, we include the lagged outcome variable Children s;t 1 .
Pooled OLS and Fixed E¤ects Results
While the …xed e¤ect estimator by construction is biased, Cov(Children s;t 1 ; " s;t ) 6 = 0, and the estimate therefore must be interpreted with caution, the regression coe¢ cients associated with schooling and income remain negative and signi…cant, although they decrease in magnitude as in Table 1 .
Overall, the initial results indicate that both schooling and income were signi…cant determinants of the US fertility decline over the period 1840-1980. However, questions regarding the interpretation of the estimates remain unanswered. For example, it is possible that Cov(X s;t ; " s;t ) 6 = 0 because of a reverse causality: lower fertility naturally leads to lower population size, which, in a decreasing return to scale economy tends to increase the level of income.
Moreover, the …xed e¤ect estimator might be inconsistent if unobserved time varying variables are correlated with the regressors in the model. For example, social norms which correlate with our observables may persist over time and this may lead to persistence in fertility. In the following, we consider alternative estimation strategies to deal with such issues. Table 3 reports the System GMM regressions of equation (2) . In column 1, we include the schooling variable along with the lagged dependent variable. The estimate on School s;t is 0:24 with a standard error of 0:08, so the GMM estimate is signi…cantly larger in numerical magnitude compared to the previous …xed e¤ect estimates. The estimate of implies that the long-run e¤ect of one additional year of schooling is 0:24=(1 0:48) = 0:46. Column 2 reveals that in this dynamic System-GMM framework, the e¤ect of income on fertility is e¤ectively zero: = 0:1 with a standard error of 0:15. Thus, the negative …xed e¤ect estimates-presented in the previous subsection-are not robust to this alternative estimation strategy, suggesting that the rise of income within US states cannot be attributed as a fundamental factor in the US fertility transition. In column 3, we enter schooling and income together, along with the mortality variables-i.e., we now study the full model as speci…ed in equation (2) . While the estimated coe¢ cient on years of schooling remains stable in both magnitude and statistical signi…cance, the sign of the coe¢ cient on logGDP/worker changes from negative to positive and becomes statistically signi…cant at the 10 percent level. The …rst four columns of the table utilize lags between three and seven time periods as instruments (i.e., the variables lagged 30-70 years). In column 4, we change this to between three and four lags. This actually raises the magnitude of the estimate on income to 0:43 with a standard error of 0:26, whereas in the 30-70 years lag model, the same coe¢ cient was estimated as 0:26 with a standard error of 0:16.
Tables 1 and 2 about here
Still, the relationship between schooling and fertility remains unchanged. Finally, it is notable from the bottom of table 4 that all the regressions pass the tests of …rst and second-order serial correlation. First order serial correlation is present in the di¤erenced residuals whereas, second order serial correlation cannot be detected. This is in line with the modeling assumptions of the estimators. Moreover, the speci…cations in columns 1, 3, and 4 are accepted with respect to the validity of their instruments with p-values that are not implausibly high suggesting that we e¤ectively address the concern regarding the "too-many-instruments" problem. We note that the model in column (2) which only include log GDP/worker appears misspeci…ed as the J-test rejects the validity of the over-identifying restrictions.
Thus, the evidence reported in Table 3 demonstrates that the rise in human capital is the primary cause of the fertility transition, while the increase in income seems to be positively related to fertility. 
Robustness analysis
This sections presents various extensions to the baseline …xed e¤ect and System GMM results reported in the previous section. Table 4 investigates further channels through which schooling could a¤ect fertility.Based on the arguments presented in section 3 we now consider the e¤ect of the average schooling years in the workforce, School/worker s;t on fertility. Considering the basic speci…cation, columns 1 and 3 replace cohort schooling with average years of schooling in the workforce, whereas columns 2 and 4 augment the basic model with it. The e¤ect of schooling years in the workforce on fertility is negative and signi…cant throughout all four speci…cations. For example, when School s;t is not included, column 3 shows that the coe¢ cient estimated by system GMM is -0.30 with a standard error of 0.01. Moreover, as expected, the e¤ect of schooling years by cohort is reduced once we control for School/worker s;t . However, reassuringly, the coe¢ cient retains the negative sign and is statistically signi…cant at the one percent level. The system GMM estimate, reported in column 4, implies that the rise in human capital between 1840 and 1980, as measured by School s;t , accounts for about 50 percent of the 13 fertility transition. We note that the test statistics associated with System GMM method in the full model in column (4) is passed, but the the p-value of the Hansen-J test has a value of 0.157 which is lower than in our baseline speci…cation. 0.156; see the bottom of column 4. 18 In sum, the evidence in Table 4 indicates that level of human capital of the parents as well as the human capital level of their children are negative related to the number of children born per woman. Table 4 about here Table 5 demonstrates that our basic conclusions are robust across alternative time periods. Columns 1 and 3 look at the pre-World War II period, while the remaining columns pertain to the 20th century (i.e., between 1900 and 1980). We …nd a consistent negative e¤ect of schooling on fertility behavior, both in the …xed e¤ects and the System GMM regressions. Further, the coe¢ cient estimate on the level of log GDP per worker becomes positive when applying the system GMM estimator, which is consistent with our baseline conclusion (see column 4) . Table 5 about here A priori, it is not clear whether schooling and fertility should be speci…ed in logs or levels.
For this reason, Table 6 presents …xed e¤ects and system GMM estimates for di¤erent functional forms. The results show negative and signi…cant e¤ects regardless of whether human capital is measured in years of schooling or log years of schooling, and regardless of whether fertility is measured levels or logs. The model speci…cations reported in columns 1 and 3 have the same functional forms as the baseline model in Murtin (2013) . He estimates the e¤ect of schooling on fertility from -0.11 to -0.04, whereas the US evidence indicate that the e¤ect is close to -0.06 (i.e., the …xed e¤ect estimate is -0.04 and the system GMM is -0.07), and a similar estimate is recovered using average years of schooling in the workforce. Finally, the coe¢ cient estimates on log GDP per worker parallel those presented in the former tables. 14 
Conclusion
This research studies the determinants of the fertility transition in a panel of the 48 contiguous US states. While the initial results from OLS estimations suggest that the rise of schooling and income both are related to the observed decrease in US fertility during the period 1840-1980, allowing for mean-reverting dynamics and persistent e¤ects in fertility, which may be endogenous to income and schooling, demonstrates the primacy of the development in schooling over income in the fertility transition. We estimate that about 50 percent of the fertility decline over past two centuries can be attributed to the rise in schooling during this period. Moreover, the evidence is consistent with the quantity-quality tradeo¤ and a role for parental education.
Future research which should look for some plausible exogenous variation in schooling across time and states to study the causal e¤ect on fertility. However, this makes it hard to compare the e¤ect of schooling to that of income as such a comparison also requires exogenous variation in income. For this reason, we believe that the our study makes an important contribution in evaluating the relative importance of income and schooling in the US fertility transition. 
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